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11 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Laos/Cambodia Ad Hoc Collection Task Force
Meeting -- 10 February 1970

1. Mr. Carver opened the meeting by giving the Task Force the benefit of his recent discussions with Dr. Kissinger to clarify the mission of the Task Force. Mr. Carver explained in detail that Dr. Kissinger wishes an intensive examination of all of the intelligence collection activities targetted against the enemy's movement of personnel and materiel through both Laos and Cambodia. The Task Force is to review current collection efforts with the view in mind of possible restructuring of available assets as well as of the possibility of add-ons, should they be deemed necessary.

2. Mr. Carver stated that there appear to be two distinct problem areas to which the Task Force must address itself with a number of sub-problems within each. He felt that one problem area pertained to that of personnel infiltration through the Laos pipeline. Almost all of our solid data on this subject comes from [] and, therefore, should be approached specifically from the [] standpoint. In the realm of materiel or logistics movements, the wide variety of sources require a review of each of the assets as related to the others. Thus, Comint, photography, sensors, agent reporting, roadwatch, SOG, and FAC activities must be taken into consideration.

3. Members of the Task Force commented on Mr. Carver's explanatory remarks and raised a number of related questions. [], DIA, in discussing personnel infiltration, stated that one of the problems in the past has been analysis of [] different analysts developing different viewpoints utilizing the same data. Mr. Carver pointed out that the mission of the Task Force was related to collection activities and not to substantive differences arising from utilization of the results of collection. At this point, it was noted that the community, while apparently having a firm handle on personnel infiltration, was hanging by a thin thread which could be cut should the enemy change his []
[] Either of these developments could deny us solid data on personnel infiltration.

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4. [] OER, raised the valid point that in reviewing the logistics problem area, it was important that these movements be treated as systems which can cross national boundaries rather than as activities in Laos separate from those in Cambodia. Thus, one system to be reviewed involves materiel movement overland down the trail from NVN through Laos to SVN and/or the tri-border area through Cambodia and SVN. The other system involves movement through Sihanoukville and thence overland to SVN as well as movements of materiel to SVN of a strictly internal Cambodian nature.

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6. Mr. Carver then proposed that subgroups be formed to investigate the problem areas and prepare preliminary papers for discussion by the Task Force. One group, chaired by Mr. Poteat, DDS&T, was to devote itself to the feasibility of the U-2 proposal. It is composed of representatives from NSA, Air Force, DIA, and FI/D. The second subgroup was to approach the personnel infiltration problem strictly from a [] exclusive of the U-2. This subgroup, chaired by [] NSA, is composed of representatives from DIA, Air Force, FI/D, DDI/OCI, and DCI/SAVA. The third subgroup was to address itself to the problems of logistics movements and is chaired by [] OER, with representatives from DIA, JCS/SACSA, DCPG, JCS/JRC, DDP/FE, DDP/TSD, and DCI/SAVA. This subgroup will review the above mentioned systems of materiel movement both through Laos and Cambodia.

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7. The draft reports of the subgroups are to be received by DCI/SAVA no later than opening of business Monday, 16 February. The drafts will be circulated to the Task Force members who will reconvene at 1500, Wednesday, 18 February, for further discussions. Mr. Carver stressed the point that the papers which emerge from the Task Force's deliberations would not go forward to Dr. Kissinger until field commanders, i.e., CINCPAC, MACV, and appropriate CIA Station Chiefs, had had the opportunity to weigh in with their opinions.

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